This publication offers theoretical instruments for comparing the stability of arguments within the context of criminal argumentation. It bargains with a couple of common argument kinds and their specific use in felony argumentation. It offers exact analyses of argument from authority, argument advert hominem, argument from lack of knowledge, slippery slope argument and different common argument varieties. each one of those argument varieties can be utilized to build arguments which are sound in addition to arguments which are unsound. to guage an issue properly one needs to be capable of distinguish the sound cases of a definite argument kind from its unsound cases. This publication promotes the advance of theoretical instruments for this job.
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Additional info for Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation (Law and Philosophy Library, Volume 112)
Sue might eventually complain that if Bill can’t recall what he said last Friday, then he is a simpleton; Bill might retort that Sue is a hysterical shrew. Before you know it, things will have taken another nasty turn. Similarly, having got the discussion nicely under way with some basic premissory agreement, things might come grinding to a halt owing to a lack of common conclusions. Then the same personal disruptions could occur. Bill might contend that Sue shows herself to be a “typical woman” in having no capacity to reason beyond her nose, or to perceive what follows from what.
This is largely because what she has to argue against is the view that women are irrational. No easy demonstration is available to show that typical women are perfectly good reasoners. So her principal argumentative resource has been removed, and Sue may easily find herself appealing to force or emotion, or committing some other kind of fallacy, because it has become the only way for her to make a point heard. Notice, though, that this is a potential mechanism for the underperformance effect of stereotype threat.
Ubel found that while 15 % of the tactics that female respondents reported were classified as Reference Gender, no males reported their gender being referenced in order to lessen their credibility. Further, no one mentioned using this tactic against another attorney (Ubel 2008, p. 49). This study did have its limitations, however. While the gender breakdown of respondents was similar to that of Kansas attorneys, the study was obviously geographically constrained and self-reported. Further, the extent to which these tactics were successful was impossible to measure.