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Or Pn' There's also being blue. Nonetheless, this philosopher might think, if we know all of the possible realizers or determinates for blueness, then we know what is essential to being blue. We wouldn't be able to reduce blueness to these realizers or determinates (being blue, after all, is what every shade of blue has in common), but still we could give something that might properly be called "an account" of blueness: necessarily, x is blue if and only if x has PI or P2 or ... or Pn (where PI-Pn is the complete list of realizers or determinates of blueness).

So far we have merely ensured that these properties covary with colors. What we still require is a semantics for color predicates showing that these predicates refer to those disjunctive properties. The most obvious way of doing this is to argue that we use 'blue', 'red', etc. I7 But disjunctive properties seem no better suited than dispositional properties for being causally responsible for those experiences. The reason to think that dispositional properties are not causally efficacious rests on the idea that any event we might "explain" by appeal to a dispositional property is explainable by appeal to the categorical ground of that disposition.

We can imagine someone in pain who does not have C-fibers firing, and we can imagine someone being in any particular 7 See Mark Johnston (1992) for further discussion of this point. , we can imagine someone who has C-fibers firing who is experiencing pleasure. For reasons I present in Chapter 5, I do not believe it is possible for two people to be physically alike though mentally different. On that point Kripke and I disagree. But Kripke's claim that two people might be mentally the same though physically different is just the claim that the mental is multiply realizable by the physical.

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