By Steven French
Steven French and Decio Krause study the metaphysical foundations of quantum physics. They draw jointly historic, logical, and philosophical views at the primary nature of quantum debris and supply new insights on a number vital concerns. concentrating on the strategies of identification and individuality, the authors discover substitute metaphysical perspectives; based on one, quantum debris are not any various from books, tables, and other people during this recognize; in accordance with the opposite, they almost certainly are. every one view comes with convinced expenditures connected and after describing their origins within the historical past of quantum concept, the authors rigorously think about even if those expenses are worthy bearing. fresh contributions to those discussions are analyzed intimately and the authors current their very own unique point of view at the concerns. the ultimate bankruptcy indicates how this attitude could be taken ahead within the context of quantum box conception.
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Extra resources for Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis
722. Lewis expresses it thus: “If two worlds differ in what they represent de re concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a haecceitistic difference. Haecceitism, as I propose to use the word, is the doctrine that there are at least some cases of haecceitistic difference between worlds. ” (Lewis op. , p. 220). The scholastic notion of de re representation raises the issue of how this representation is to be effected. An alternative approach to haecceitism is to understand it in terms of the identity conditions for possible worlds: there can be non-qualitative differences between worlds and such worlds are not identical.
In particular, the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles then becomes true, if vacuous. However, such an understanding is problematic. 29 However, talk of ‘entering into’ is surely misplaced in this case: it seems apt in the case of an individual ‘entering into’ a relation, such as parenthood for example, but not in the case of an individual entering into the relation of identity with itself. In the former case the relation can be formed only when there is more than one individual; the establishment of the relation is conceptually posterior to the existence of the relevant individuals.
P. 225. 42 Ibid. 43 Can the same substance exist in different possible worlds and possess different properties in those worlds? A positive answer would suggest a view of possible worlds which overlap at the level of the substantial substratum. Lewis has argued against overlap views on the grounds that they involve the contradictory assignment of properties to individuals (Lewis op. , pp. 198–210). Such arguments appear to have no force against this version of the overlap view. Thus one could maintain haecceitism without haecceities in this sense and without having to be a nominalist.