By Bede Rundle
Brain in motion demanding situations the dominant view in modern philosophy that human motion is pushed by means of ideas and needs a lot as a laptop is made to operate via the operation of actual reasons. Bede Rundle rejects the materialist view of brain and the causal idea of motion; his replacement strategy elucidates such key thoughts as concept, trust, wish, purpose, and freedom to offer a clean view of human habit.
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We shall now try to make clear this involvement. The case for a causal role for sensations would appear, if anything, stronger than with thought. But consider. I touch something very hot and withdraw my hand. We shall suppose that it is not a matter of the sensation of heat or pain giving me a reason for taking my hand away-it happens too quickly for me even to think. Does that leave the sensation as unmistakably cause of the movement? Once the possibility of acting for a reason is set aside, a person's explanation why a movement of his took place is certainly not in general incorrigible.
For Wittgenstein, the concept of pain would appear to be interchangeable with that of an unpleasant sensation; certainly, this is all that is yielded if we confine attention to concomitant behaviour. And that is wrong. Vertigo, certain tactile sensations, itches, and nausea count as unpleasant, but not as pains. So what distinguishes the peculiar kind of unpleasantness that constitutes pain as opposed to, say, disagreeable sensations of cold, dizziness, or pins and needles? On many occasions we find associated damage to bodily tissue, as with a cut, a burn, or a bruising blow, and we should naturally look for such factors when seeking to give examples of likely pain.
If all we ever had to go on were reactions to stimuli, then we should have no cause to think in terms of sensations, whether of pain or of anything else, but we should be dealing with phenomena offering no more of a grip to the psychological than does the twitching of a lifeless frog's leg when an electric current is applied to it. Indeed, any ascription of pain which depends on postulating it as a link in a causal chain runs a very real risk of finding itself agnostic about the Mental Antecedents of Action very existence of pains.