By Gilbert Harman
Do ethical questions have goal solutions? during this nice debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and ethical scepticism. In his view, ethical disagreements are like disagreements approximately what to pay for a home; there are not any right solutions sooner than time, other than on the subject of one or one other ethical framework.
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case opposed to ethical objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it really is attainable to determine the proper solutions to a few ethical questions. In her view, a few ethical disagreements are like disagreements approximately no matter if the home has a ghost.
Harman and Thomson then respond to one another. this significant, energetic available trade can be useful to all scholars of ethical conception and meta-ethics.
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Additional resources for Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
Habermas 1985). But this primacy of communicative practices still leaves Habermas without a knowledge criterion. His mutual isolation of technical, historical, and emancipatory knowledge leaves him without an overall criterion to determine, of any given piece of knowledge, which of those categories it belongs in. There are only the ‘justificatory practices of a language community’ (Habermas 1999, p. 244), which for Habermas (unlike, say, Rorty) can certainly be ‘rational’ by virtue of their roots in culture and history.
The direction of change is from the pragmatic to the semantic, from practice to theory, 40 As he spells out in Habermas (2000), pp. 8, 14–15; ‘epistemic rationality’ becomes a specific subform of communicative rationality more generally (Habermas 1999, pp. ). 30 Carnap and twentieth-century thought with no feedback in the other direction. It is an opposite one-sidedness to that of Quine (or of the Vienna Circle’s original ‘rational reconstruction’ programme). g. Habermas 1985). But this primacy of communicative practices still leaves Habermas without a knowledge criterion.
Carnap is acknowledged in the preface as the philosopher to whom Ayer owes most and with whom he agrees most closely. 48 It is essentially a popularised account of the pre-1930 Vienna Circle position (the Aufbau and the Tractatus), hardly acknowledging the major obstacles to such a view that had long been discussed in Vienna. 49 And then after 1950, Quine was able to convince the world he had ‘overthrown’ Carnap’s ‘verification theory of meaning’, pinning on Carnap a view he had not held for twenty years.