By Fred Dretske
This number of essays by way of eminent thinker Fred Dretske brings jointly paintings at the concept of information and philosophy of brain spanning thirty years. the 2 parts mix to put the foundation for a naturalistic philosophy of brain. The essays specialise in belief, wisdom, and attention. jointly, they convey the interconnectedness of Dretske's paintings in epistemology and his extra modern principles on philosophy of brain, laying off mild at the hyperlinks that may be made among the 2. This assortment should be a precious source for a variety of philosophers and their scholars, and also will be of curiosity to cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers of biology.
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Extra info for Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays
Let me first deal briefly with the trivial aspect. The epistemic operators I mean to be speaking about when I say that all epistemic operators are semipenetrating include the following: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) S knows that. . 5 sees (or can see) that. . 5 has reason (or a reason) to believe that. . There is evidence to suggest that. . S can prove that. . S learned (discovered, found out) that. . In relation to our evidence it is probable that. . Part of what needs to be established in showing that these are all semipenetrating operators is that they all possess a degree of penetration greater than that of the nonpenetrating operators.
This is still presupposed. I may have such a reason, of course, and chances are good that I do have such a reason or I would not have referred to what I believe to be boiling as coffee, but to have a reason to believe the coffee is boiling is not, thereby, to have a reason to believe it is coffee that is boiling. One would expect that if this is true of the semipenetrating operators, then it should also be true of the nonpenetrating operators. They also should fail to reach the presuppositions.
In this I agree with the skeptic. I part company with the skeptic only when he concludes from this that, therefore, you do not know that the animals in the pen are zebras. I part with him because I reject the principle he uses in reaching this conclusion — the principle that if you do not know that Q is true, when it is known that P entails Q, then you do not know that P is true. What I am suggesting is that we simply admit that we do not know that some of these contrasting "skeptical alternatives" are not the case, but refuse to admit that we do not know what we originally said we knew.